The End of an Era in U.S. Relations with Germany — and perhaps Europe
Angela Merkel’s 16-year chancellorship of Germany will end with the elections of September 26. The relationship between the U.S. and Germany has always been strategically important in resolving international concerns, and President Biden recently called the European Union “a fundamental partner in tackling the full range of significant issues facing our world today.” Given Germany’s critical role in determining the EU’s foreign policy, Biden could find that his ability to carry out his foreign policy agenda and combat Russian geopolitical maneuvers will very much depend on the outcome of those elections.
Nearly all the issues on the Biden administration’s foreign policy agenda intersect with Europe, whether it’s diplomatic support for preventing a nuclear Iran with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), economic stability and recovery post-pandemic, or military support for fighting terrorist groups in the Middle East and Africa. Nowhere, however, has that cooperation been more important than in countering the Russia challenge. Time and again, the German chancellor cast the deciding vote regarding the transatlantic community’s approach to Russia and its aggressive leader, Vladimir Putin. Merkel speaks Russian and grew up in Soviet-controlled East Germany, and a recognition of the interdependency of the German and Russian economies influenced her highly cautious approach to Russia. Merkel continued a steady dialogue with Putin in her years as chancellor and maintained extensive business ties, most controversial of which was the development of the Nordstream 2 natural gas pipeline with Russia.
Her hybrid Russia policy, combining the pragmatic engagement of former Chancellor Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik with rhetoric chastising Russia’s leader for aggression and human rights violations, frustrated many of her allies in the U.S. and in other parts of the EU who felt that more forceful responses towards Russia’s belligerence were needed. After Russia invaded Georgia in 2008, Merkel refused to impose economic sanctions on Moscow, believing that the geopolitical stakes involved were not worth the economic costs to Germany and Europe. But in 2014, when Putin invaded Ukraine, Merkel understood the danger of Russia’s unilateral annexation of territory near the center of Europe, and so led the EU in joining the Obama administration’s efforts to impose sanctions. The question moving forward is whether Merkel’s patient attempts to steer a middle ground on relations with Russia will continue, or will there be a change in tone following elections?
Based on recent polls, the Social Democrats (SPD) are projected to win the largest number of votes in the election, but they will almost surely require a coalition to govern and have so far rejected the idea of partnering with Merkel’s Christian-Democratic Union Party (CDU/CSU), with whom they have served in a Grand Coalition since 2013. While SPD’s candidate for chancellor, Olaf Scholz, has recently said that he believes that Germany needs a continuation of Ostpolitik and dialogue, his personal history differs greatly from Merkel’s. He grew up in West Germany and spent much of his political career in cosmopolitan, Western-oriented Hamburg. While he may be willing to continue German dialogue with Russia, his connections to Russian culture, political history and language vary dramatically from Merkel’s, and he will likely have her party in opposition to his eventual government.
Scholz will likely be forced into a three-party coalition (the first in German federal government history) The most probable coalitions partners for the SPD are the Greens and the liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP). The leaders of both of these parties have been vocally critical of Putin and could hamper Scholz’s attempts to maintain a dialogue with Russia.
The FDP’s party leader, Christian Linder, for example, has called German sanctions over Putin’s arrest and jailing of political rival Aleksey Navalny “toothless,” and has called for further punishment of Putin’s inner circle for these and other human rights violations. However, Putin should be particularly concerned about the influence that the burgeoning Green Party could have on Russian-German relations. Their candidate for chancellor, Annalena Baerbock, has been very public in her criticism of Russia’s human rights abuses and was also a firm opponent to the Nordstream 2 pipeline. While she notes the importance of dialogue, she has also called for ‘hardness’ in Germany’s relations with Russia — a major change in tone from the Merkel era. Although the Greens or FDP would be unlikely to get prominent roles in foreign affairs or defense in the coalition government, they would certainly increase the pressure on an SPD-led government to take a more aggressive stance towards punishing Russian misadventures.
Following the election, Biden will find that Germany is likely focused on internal coalition negotiations, which are anticipated to last through December, if not longer. While Merkel will remain the caretaker chancellor as the government is being formed, she will not have the same leverage to push through policies at the EU level. This leaves Biden in a difficult situation, as the strongest voice among EU member states with Germany sidelined would be France. After the diplomatic dust-up resulting from the Biden administration’s deal with Australia over nuclear submarines, President Macron will hardly be motivated to push any U.S.-led agendas within the EU. France not only recalled their Ambassador to the U.S. in its pique, it also has prodded EU structures to join in the criticism of the U.S. for this poorly handled affair, leading to the postponement of a EU-U.S. trade and technology meeting in protest over the submarine agreement.
With Merkel a lame duck chancellor and no U.S. Ambassador yet in place to help smooth relations with the new German national leadership, Biden may indeed find himself without a crucial partner in Germany this autumn. This, combined with sour relations with Paris, will make it that much more difficult to garner EU support for and focus on key U.S. foreign affairs concerns. While the administration has an ambitious agenda for the remainder of this year, encouraging European allies to work with the U.S. administration on those issues (combating climate change, pushing back on Chinese and Russian aggression, and finding solutions to knotty problems such as Iranian and North Korean nuclear ambitions), will be substantially more difficult with a change in leadership in Berlin, and a petulant ally in Paris.
Ian Kelly is a retired Foreign Service Officer and Ambassador (ret.) in Residence at Northwestern University. Kirk Samson is the founder of the political risk consulting firm Samson Atlantic in Chicago.
